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Abstract—In a networked system, functionality can be seriously
endangered when nodes are infected, due to internal random
failures or a contagious virus that develops into an epidemic.
Given a snapshot of the network representing the nodes’ states
(infected or healthy), infection analysis refers to distinguishing
an epidemic from random failures and gathering information
for effective countermeasure design. This analysis is challenging
due to irregular network structure, heterogeneous epidemic
spreading, and noisy observations. This paper treats a network
snapshot as a graph signal, and develops effective approaches
for infection analysis based on graph signal processing. For
the macro (network-level) analysis aiming to distinguish an
epidemic from random failures, 1) multiple detection metrics
are defined based on the graph Fourier transform (GFT) and
neighborhood characteristics of the graph signal; 2) a new
class of graph wavelets, distance-based graph wavelets (DBGWs),
are developed; and 3) a machine learning-based framework
is designed employing either the GFT spectrum or the graph
wavelet coefficients as features for infection analysis. DBGWs
also enable the micro (node-level) infection analysis, through
which the performance of epidemic countermeasures can be
improved. Extensive simulations are conducted to demonstrate
the effectiveness of all the proposed algorithms in various network
settings.
Index Terms—Infection Analysis, epidemic spreading, graph
signal processing, graph Fourier transform, graph wavelets.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, the size of the networked systems, suchas mobile wireless networks, computer networks, cloud
networks and smart grids, keeps growing. These large-scale
networks are increasingly prone to a wide variety of viruses and
attacks. For instance, viruses such as ILOVEYOU and My Doom
infected millions of computers through email spreading [2], [3].
Such viruses or worms are capable of imposing an enormous
loss to a network. For example, a virus which causes servers to
malfunction in a cloud network can lead to a costly repairment
before the network’s revival, so does those that corrupt the
transmitted information between power sensors in a smart grid
network. To safeguard the network functionality, it is of great
importance that infection, or abnormality in the network, can be
quickly detected and categorized upon occurrence. Abnormality
detection is an important topic in network/system management,
and has been studied extensively (e.g., [4]–[6]). With respect to
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the causality, abnormalities can be broadly categorized into two
types: random failures and epidemics. In contrast to random
failures, an epidemic spreads in the network via contacts among
entities, and is therefore more hazardous. In the macro level
analysis of infections, once abnormalities appear in the network,
it is crucial to determine promptly whether they are contagious,
since effective measures to combat epidemics, e.g., quarantine,
may take some time to deploy while it is a waste of resource
if the abnormalities turn out to be random failures. On the
other hand, from the perspective of micro level analysis, it
is desirable to provide useful information for countermeasure
deployment, e.g., which nodes to quarantine first to restrain
an epidemic or which network portion to receive priority in
vaccination. Therefore, we are motivated to ask the following
research questions: (1) How can we quickly distinguish an
epidemic from random failures, based on the observation of
the network condition? (2) In the case of an epidemic, what
information can the observation provide to facilitate deployment
of an effective countermeasure?
In this regard, there has been some research on the detection
of causality for epidemics, e.g., rumor source rooting in online
social networks (OSNs) [7]–[9], or spreading control in a
population [10]–[12], where the primary assumption is the
existence of an epidemic or a rumor in the network. In these
cases, the state evolution of the network is driven by the
epidemic spreading process. Stemming from epidemiology, an
epidemic process is useful for capturing the spreading behavior
when individuals change their states upon having a contact with
others. However, in addition to rumors or epidemics, individuals
in a network can receive ideas or information independently or
get sick randomly, which may also lead to irregular behaviors
of the nodes. There is little research on differentiating an
epidemic from random failures. To this end, Milling et al.
designed a Median Ball algorithm for the same purpose [13].
This algorithm makes the decision by solely comparing the
radius of a ball which contains a certain portion of the infected
nodes to a threshold. However, an inherent assumption in [13]
is the homogeneity of the network edges1, which leads to an
isotropically concentrated area of infected nodes within a region.
This limitation has prompted a follow-up work [14], in which
two algorithms for the infection detection problem are proposed:
Ball Density and Relative Ball Density. Ball Density algorithm
makes the decision by comparing the number of infected nodes
inside a ball with a certain radius to a threshold. The improved
version of it, Relative Ball Density (RBD), compares the ratio
1i.e., the epidemic has the same contact probability along all edges.
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2of the number of infected nodes inside a ball and that outside
the ball with a threshold. In these two algorithms, the radius
of the ball has to be chosen empirically. Also, due to their
inherent mechanism of detection, these algorithms naturally
fail in the presence of multiple epidemics in the network or
when an epidemic stems from multiple initial seeds. Moreover,
although these two algorithms can handle the heterogeneity of
the edges, it is found through simulation (see Section VIII) that
they exhibit a poor performance when the underlying graph
structure is dense and irregular. These limitations render the
ball density-based algorithms ineffective in real-world settings
such as the Internet and social networks.
Seemingly simple, differentiating epidemics from random
failures is actually a challenging problem due to the following
considerations. (1) Networks are generally large and irregular;
hence it is difficult or even impossible to track numerous
contacts in the network to determine whether the abnormality
is spontaneous or being spread from others. (2) From the
perspective of a network administrator, available information
about the abnormality can be as limited as a single snapshot
representing the nodes’ status, an example of which is il-
lustrated in Figure 1. This figure depicts two instances of
an infected scale-free (SF)2 network [16] with 100 nodes
when the infection is due to an epidemic stemming from
one source node (left snapshot) and random failures (right
snapshot), respectively. Due to the irregular structure of the
network, even in this small-scale network, it is challenging to
identify the root causes of abnormalities by simple inspection.
Also, the existence of false positives (healthy nodes reported
as infected) and false negatives (infected nodes reported as
healthy), or epidemics originating from multiple source nodes,
may further blur the difference between random failures and an
epidemic, which adds another level of difficulty to the problem.
(3) Straightforward detection measures, e.g., examining the
footprints of virus codes, are not applicable when it comes to
a different type of virus.
To address these challenges, we are motivated to design
a generic framework that can accurately detect the causality
of an abnormality in an irregular heterogeneous network, and
provide necessary information for countermeasure design, from
a single snapshot of the network status. In this regard, we
draw a connection between infection analysis and graph signal
processing (GSP), mainly developed in [17]–[21] recently, by
incorporating the nodes’ status into the network structure and
interpreting a network snapshot as a graph signal. The main
goal of this paper is to provide simple, yet effective, online
algorithms to conduct infection analysis based on GSP. In
summary, to conduct the macro (network-level) analysis: 1)
we propose multiple detection metrics based on the graph
Fourier Transform (GFT) spectrum, along with their robustness
analysis. 2) We develop a new class of graph wavelets called
distance-based graph wavelets (DBGWs). 3) We utilize GFT
spectrum, spectral graph wavelets [21], and DBGWs in a
machine learning-based framework to carry out the analysis. For
the micro (node-level) analysis, countermeasure design based
2A popular model for many real world networks including social networks
and the Internet [15].
Figure 1: Comparison between an epidemic (left) and random failures
(right) in an SF network with size 100 for the same number of infected
nodes (50). Red nodes are infected while the blue nodes are in a
healthy state.
on DBGWs are further investigated. Extensive simulations
are conducted to verify the effectiveness of all the proposed
algorithms in various network settings.
Structure of the paper: System model is explained in
Section II, which contains discussions of the network model,
spreading process, macro and the micro analysis of infections,
and construction of a graph signal based on a snapshot
of the network. Basics of the graph Fourier Transform is
given in Section III. In Section IV a new family of graph
wavelets, called distance-based graph wavelets, are proposed
and developed for the purpose of infection analysis. Also,
spectral graph wavelets are presented in this section. Metric-
based and machine learning-based macro analysis of infections
are presented in Section V and VI, respectively. Section VII is
devoted to the micro analysis of infections using DBGWs.
Simulation results are presented in Section VIII. Finally,
Section IX concludes the paper and provides directions for
future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the terminologies and the models
for both the macro and the micro analysis of infections.
A. Network Model
Entities in the system of interest are abstracted to a set
of nodes V . Contacts between two entities are described by
an edge connecting a pair of nodes, while the frequency of
contacts, or equivalently, the probability that the virus spreads
along an edge is proportional to the weight of that edge.
A network is represented by a weighted undirected graph
G = (V, E , w, β), where V denotes the set of nodes, E denotes
the set of edges, w is the weight function, w : V2 → (0, β],
defined for adjacent nodes i and j as: w(i, j) = βaij , ∀aij 6= 0
(w(i, j) = 0, ∀aij = 0), where aij ∈ {0} ∪ [1,∞) is an
element of the adjacency matrix A representing the distance
between the nodes, and β ∈ (0, 1] represents the basic infection
rate. Similarly, w(i, j)’s are collected into a weight matrix W.
The distance between two nodes can be interpreted differently
in various networks, e.g., physical distance between two
sensors in a wireless sensor network, strength of the social
interaction between two nodes in a social network, frequency
of contact between two computers in a computer network, etc.
In all the scenarios, it is assumed that a small/large distance
corresponds to frequent/rare exchange of information between
the individuals. Henceforth, a connected network is assumed.
3B. Abnormality Model
For an arbitrary index ordering of the nodes in the set V =
{v1, · · · , vN}, |V| = N , let xi(t) denote a label representing
the state of node vi ∈ V at time t, which can take two possible
values: infected (xi(t) = “infected”), or healthy (xi(t) =
“healthy”). Upon the occurrence of an epidemic, each node
in the set of infected nodes, vi ∈ It , {vi ∈ V|xi(t) =
“infected”}, attempts to infect any of its susceptible neighbors,
vj ∈ Nvi \ It, Nvi , {vj ∈ V|(vj , vi) ∈ E}, with probability
of w(i, j) during each time step. In the random failure scenario,
irrelevant to the states of other nodes, a healthy node v ∈ V
may fail (become infected) with a probability pfail.
C. Reporting Model
Let X(t) = {xi(t)}vi∈V illustrate the true states of all the
nodes in V . Also, let ri(t) denote a label representing the
observed/reported state of node vi at time t. A snapshot of the
network {ri(t)}vi∈V may contain faulty observations (false
positives and false negatives) due to noise, the observation
resolution constraints, or adversarial nodes that deliberately
report inaccurate states. We restrict the input of our algorithms
to be one single snapshot of the network; and thus omit the
time index, and denote a snapshot as R = {ri}vi∈V .
D. Macro vs. Micro Analysis of Infections
In this work, given a snapshot of the network R = {ri}vi∈V ,
two categories of analysis are conducted: the macro and the
micro analysis. The objective of the macro analysis is to
determine the existence of an epidemic in a network, which
is referred to as infection detection. Let the null hypothesis
H0 be the absence of an epidemic in the network, and H1 the
alternative. The detection performance can be measured by the
average infection detection probability (AIDP ) defined as:
AIDP = p(H0|H0)p0 + p(H1|H1)p1, (1)
where p0 and p1 are the probabilities of existence of random
failures and an epidemic, respectively. In this context, p(H1|H0)
denotes the probability of Type I error (a false alarm), while
p(H0|H1) indicates the probability of Type II error (a miss).
After determining the existence of an epidemic, node-level
analysis can be conducted to determine an efficient way of
applying the countermeasures, which is the goal of the micro
analysis of infections. In this work, we focus on two well-
known countermeasures: vaccination and quarantine.
E. Construction of a Graph Signal based on a Snapshot
For an arbitrary labeling order of the nodes in the set
V = {v1, · · · , vN}, and an arbitrary set of real numbers
S = {s1, · · · , sN}, where |S| = |V| = N , a graph signal
S is a one to one mapping between the elements of V and
S defined as S: vi 7→ si, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In this study, based
on the reported snapshot of the network R = {ri}vi∈V , we
pursue a binary graph signal assignment and construct the
corresponding graph signal as:
S(vi) , S(i) =
{
A, if ri = “infected”,
−A, if ri = “healthy”,
(2)
where A ∈ R+.3 Based on a noisy snapshot, the observed/noisy
graph signal S(n) is the sum of two components: the true
(initial) signal value S(i) and a noise vector n = S(n) − S(i)
due to faulty reports.
III. GRAPH FOURIER TRANSFORM
The graph Laplacian matrix L of a (connected) network
represented by G = (V, E , w, β) is defined as:
L , D−W, (3)
where D is a diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal element
dii defined as: dii =
∑N
j=1 w(i, j). For the sorted eigenvalues
0 = λ0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λN−1 = λmax of matrix L, let
{u0, · · · ,uN−1} denote the corresponding set of orthonormal
eigenvectors. Eigenvectors of the graph Laplacian matrix can
be considered as an analogy to the basis functions of the classic
Fourier transform {ej2pifx}, where each of them describes a
specific frequency. In this paradigm, the associated frequency to
an eigenvector is determined by the corresponding eigenvalue.
For a graph signal, the notion of frequency can be interpreted as
the variation of the signal across the network. As is known [17],
as the eigenvalue increases, the corresponding eigenvector
exhibits more variations across the nodes in the network. The
GFT spectrum Sˆ of a graph signal S ∈ RN is defined as the
projection of S onto the space of graph Laplacian eigenvectors:
Sˆ = [Sˆ(λ0), Sˆ(λ1), · · · , Sˆ(λN−1)], (4)
where each element is the GFT of signal S at a certain
frequency/eigenvalue, given by:
Sˆ(λl) =< S,ul >=
N∑
i=1
S(i)ul(i), 0 ≤ l ≤ N − 1. (5)
Consequently, each element of the GFT spectrum can be
interpreted as the similarity of the signal to the corresponding
eigenvector.
IV. GRAPH WAVELETS
A. Background
The classic continuous wavelet transform (CWT) and its
applications have been extensively studied in literature, mainly
in the image processing area [22], [23]. In CWT, wavelets
at different locations and scales are constructed based on
translating and scaling of a mother wavelet ψ:
ψs,a(x) =
1
s
ψ
(
x− a
s
)
, (6)
where s and a correspond to the scale and location, respectively.
Wavelet coefficients at scale s and location a for a function
(signal) f(x), Wf (s, a), are defined as:
Wf (s, a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
s
ψ∗
(
x− a
s
)
f(x)dx. (7)
3Allowing the graph signal S associated with the snapshot {ri(t)}vi∈V to
record the time since nodes have become infected enables analysis in a finer
grain. However, as shown in simulations, the proposed algorithms can exhibit
an excellent accuracy by taking the proposed “binary” input.
4The theory of CWT is mainly developed to analyze the signals
described in regular and Euclidean spaces. In the following,
we propose a new class of graph wavelets and develop them
for the purpose of infection analysis on a network structure.
B. Distance-based Graph Wavelets (DBGWs)
In this work, we develop DBGWs for a circle-shape
neighborhood; however, using a similar approach, they can
be developed for other cases. The following definitions are
presented for the ease of discussion.
Definition 1. For a given graph G = (V, E , w, β), a
path with length n between nodes vi and vj is de-
fined as a sequence of distinct vertices P (vi, vj) =
[vi, vk1 , vk2 , · · · , vkn−1 , vj ], where w(kj , kj+1) > 0, j =
1, · · · , n−2, and w(i, k1),w(kn−1, j) > 0. Let Pvjvi denote the
set of all the paths between nodes vi and vj .
Definition 2. For a given graph G = (V, E , w, β) and an
operator O ∈ {+,×}, the path weight (PW) of a given path
P (vi, vj) = [vi, vk1 , vk2 , · · · , vkn−1 , vj ] is defined as follows:
PW (vi, vj)|P (vi,vj),O =w(i, k1) O w(k1, k2)
O w(k2, k3) · · ·O w(kn−1, j). (8)
Considering this definition, the dominant path (DP) and the
weight of the dominant path (WDP) between nodes vi and
vj are defined as:
DP (vi, vj)|O = arg max
P (vi,vj)∈Pvjvi
PW (vi, vj)|P (vi,vj),O, (9)
WDP (vi, vj)|O = max
P (vi,vj)∈Pvjvi
PW (vi, vj)|P (vi,vj),O. (10)
Also, the length of the dominant path (LDP) is given by:
LDP (vi, vj)|O =
∣∣∣∣DP (vi, vj)|O∣∣∣∣− 1, (11)
where |.| denotes the cardinality of a set. Using this terminology,
two nodes vi and vj are considered to be r pseudo-hops away
if LDP (vi, vj)|O = r.
Remark 1. As compared to the most of networking-related
literature, in this work, the definition of PW, DP, WDP, and LDP
are presented based on a mathematical operator O. Choosing
O = + coincides with the conventional definition of these
parameters. However, it is shown below that choosing O = ×
captures the spreading nature of an epidemic.
Remark 2. The term “pseudo-hop” is used to avoid confusion
with the concept of “hop” in graph theory. Note that the pseudo-
hop is defined with respect to the dominant path between two
nodes. For example, assume that there are only two disjoint
paths between nodes vi and vj . The first path is three hops
with weights 1,0.9, and 1, while the other path is one hop with
weight 0.01. In this case, when O = ×, nodes vi and vj are
3-pseudo hopes away.
Let Crvc denote the set of the nodes located at most r pseudo-
hops away from vc, which will be referred to as the set of
nodes inside a disk with center vc and radius r for simplicity.
Note that C0vc = {vc}.
Definition 3. Centering at a node vc, for a specific radius
r ≥ 1, a ring C(r ∆ (r−1))vc describes the set of the nodes which
are exactly r pseudo-hops away from node vc.4 Mathematically:
C(r ∆ (r−1))vc = Crvc \ Cr−1vc = Crvc − Cr−1vc . (12)
Definition 4. For a specified center node vc and a radius
s ∈ Z+, s ≥ 1, the wavelet function of DBGW, ψvc,s : V → R,
is defined as follows:
ψDBGWvc,s (v) =

H(WDP (vc,v)|O)mss′∑
n∈C(s
′ ∆ (s′−1))
vc
H(WDP (vc,n)|O)
∀v ∈ C(s
′ ∆ (s′−1))
vc , 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s,
ms0 if v = vc (s
′ = 0),
0 ∀v ∈ C(s
′ ∆ (s′−1))
vc , s
′ > s,
(13)
where H : R+ → R+ is an arbitrary increasing function, and
mss′ is a non-zero constant chosen for each s
′ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , s},
such that
∑s
s′=0m
s
s′ = 0. Parameter s takes the interpretation
of “scale” as in CWT.
Theorem 1. Centering at an arbitrary node vc, for an arbitrary
scale s, wavelet functions of DBGW satisfy the zero mean
property of a mother wavelet. Mathematically:∑
v∈V
ψDBGWvc,s (v) = 0. (14)
Proof. The proof can be obtained using algebraic manipulations
based on Eq. (13).
Remark 3. For an unweighted graph G = (V, E) and a
linear increasing function H(x) = cx, c ∈ R+, when O = +
(assuming the same weight for all the edges), the wavelet
functions of DBGW is given by:
ψDBGWvc,s (v) =

ms
s′
|C(s
′ ∆ (s′−1))
vc |
∀v ∈ C(s
′ ∆ (s′−1))
vc , 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s,
ms0 if v = vc (s
′ = 0),
0 ∀v ∈ C(s
′ ∆ (s′−1))
vc , s
′ > s,
(15)
which with some modifications, matches the wavelet functions
presented in [20], suitable for traffic analysis.
Centering at a node vc, for a specified scale s, the wavelet
function of DBGW assigns non-zero values to the nodes
which are located inside the set Csvc and zero value to the rest
of the nodes. Consequently, the wavelet function of DBGW
captures the signal variation in different neighborhoods through
suitable choice of the center locations and scales. Centering
at an arbitrary node vc, for an arbitrary scale s, the wavelet
coefficients for a signal S ∈ RN can be obtained as follows:
WDBGWS (vc, s) =<
[
ψDBGWvc,s (v1), · · · , ψDBGWvc,s (vN )
]
,S > . (16)
A node v ∈ V can locally compute its wavelet function at
scale s when the set Csv along with WDP (v, v′)|O, ∀v′ ∈ Csv
4The mathematical operator O is omitted in the notations for simplicity.
5are known at the node. This is a nice property in large-scale
networks, since nodes can derive the wavelet functions in
a distributed fashion, which notably improves the speed of
analysis.
C. DBGW Design for Epidemic Detection
1) Epidemic Spreading Analysis: For a given non-infected
node vj , the probability of getting the infection at the next time
instant from one of its infected neighbor nodes vi is w(i, j).
Similarly, if vi and vj are two-hops away, the probability of
getting the infection from node vi in two time instants along
the path P (vi, vj) = [vi, vk, vj ] is w(i, k)w(k, j), where vk
is an initially non-infected node (and gets infected from vi
subsequently). With the same reasoning, we can derive the
probability of vj getting the infection from an infected node
vi along the path P (vi, vj) = [vi, v1, · · · , vr−1, vj ] in r time
instants, that is, PW (vi, vj)|P (vi,vj),×. The following theorem
is the result of this discussion.
Theorem 2. Assuming the length of the observation time
window T and a given snapshot at time t ≤ T , the probability
of a healthy node vi /∈ It getting the infection from node
vj ∈ It is an increasing function of WDP (vi, vj)|×.
2) Designing the Parameters of DBGWs: The mathematical
operator O should allow drawing a nice connection to the
spreading aspect of an infection. Considering Theorem 2, the
operator is chosen as: O = ×. Also, according to Eq. (13), each
element of sequence {mss′}ss′=0 determines the effect of the
graph signal values of nodes located in a certain neighborhood
on the amplitude of the wavelet coefficient centered at a
node. In particular ∀r ∈ [1, s], if msr = 0, that particular
neighborhood is neglected, and if msrm
s
0 > 0 (m
s
rm
s
0 < 0)
the more similarity (contrast) between the signal values of the
nodes in that neighborhood and the center node leads to a larger
wavelet coefficient at the center node. Also, function H controls
the wavelet function amplitude in a certain neighborhood. For
the application considered in this work, H(x) = cxk, where
c, k ∈ Z+ is in general a good choice.
Example 1. Given a graph signal, the goal is to measure the
contrast between the signal values of a disk with radius s− 1
and the signal values of an outer ring with radius s, s ≥ 2,
around each node. In this case, a good candidate sequence for
{mss′}ss′=0 is choosing ms0, · · · ,mss−1 > 0 while mss < 0 such
that
∑s
s′=0m
s
s′ = 0. Figure 2 depicts a graph and the values
of the wavelet function of DBGW5 centered at node a at scale
2, where m20 = 0.7, m
2
1 = 0.3, m
2
2 = −1, and H(x) = x.
According to Eq. (16), WDBGWS (a, 2) reaches its maximum
(in the absolute value sense) when the signal values of all the
nodes inside C1a is the opposite of those located at C2∆1a .
Remark 4. The sequence {mss′}ss′=0 can be obtained using a
zero-mean continuous real function supported in the interval
[0, 1]. In this case, for a given s′, mss′ corresponds to the value
of the integral of the function in the interval [ s
′
s+1 ,
s′+1
s+1 ].
5It can be seen that nodes with larger WDP to the center node take larger
absolute values.
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Figure 2: An example of wavelet function of DBGW. The weight of
each edge is indicated numerically and also in the thickness of the
connection. The color of each vertex depicts the value of the wavelet
function at the node. C1a = {a, b, c, d, e} and C2∆1a = {f, g, h, i, j}.
D. Spectral Graph Wavelets (SGWs)
Consider a weighted graph G = (V, E , w, β), where |V| =
N . Spectral graph wavelets (SGWs) [21] are defined based on
the choice of a kernel function g : R+ → R+, which behaves
similarly to a band-pass filter:
g(0) = 0, lim
x→∞ g(x) = 0. (17)
In this case, the graph wavelet functions at scale s centered at
vertex vc ∈ V can be defined as:
ψSGWvc,s (v) =
N−1∑
l=0
g(sλl)ul(vc)ul(v), v ∈ V, (18)
where ul’s are the eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix defined
in Section III. Centering at a node a ∈ V , for an arbitrary scale
s, the wavelet coefficients of a signal S ∈ RN is given by:
WSGWS (vc, s) =<
[
ψSGWvc,s (v1), · · · , ψSGWvc,s (vN )
]
,S > . (19)
As compared to the neighborhood-based filtering approach
in DBGWs, the nodes’ wavelet coefficients of SGWs are
constructed based on filtering the eigenvectors via the kernel
function. Hence, in general, SGWs do not provide the desired
node-level information of an infection. Also, similar to GFT,
SGW design requires the knowledge of Laplacian matrix
eigenvectors. We will combine this construction of graph
wavelets with machine learning techniques and use them for
the macro analysis of infections in Section VI.
V. METRIC-BASED MACRO ANALYSIS OF INFECTIONS
A. Methodology
Given a network and the corresponding graph Laplacian
matrix and its eigenvectors, the eigenvector corresponding
to λ0 = 0 has the same value among all the nodes, and
thus captures the “DC” value of the signal. In general [17],
small/large eigenvalues correspond to slow/fast variation in
the magnitude across the components of the corresponding
eigenvector (equivalently, across the nodes in the network).
Therefore, upon projection of a graph signal onto the eigen-
space of the graph Laplacian matrix (see Eq. (5)), the low-
end components in the GFT spectrum (i.e., Sˆ(λi) with small
values of i in Eq. (4)) intuitively capture the low-frequency
components of the graph signal (across the network), and vice
versa. Considering this fact, we propose the following metrics
to capture the signal behavior from the spectrum of the GFT.
6Definition 5. For a signal S ∈ RN with the GFT spectrum Sˆ,
the energy of the spectrum Eng(Sˆ) is defined as the sum of
the magnitude of the frequency components, i.e.,
Eng(Sˆ) = || Sˆ ||1. (20)
For a binary signal S = [A,−A,A, · · · ], A ∈ R \ {0}, the
normalized signal can be derived as: S˜ = SA . Similarly, the
normalized GFT spectrum and its energy are given by: ˜ˆS = SˆA
and E˜ng(Sˆ) = Eng(Sˆ)A , respectively.
Definition 6. The α− high-frequency energy concentration
ratio HECRα(Sˆ), where α ∈ [ 1N , 1], is defined as:
HECRα(Sˆ) =
∑N−1
i=bN(1−α)c |Sˆ(λi)|
Eng(Sˆ)
. (21)
Definition 7. The γ− low-frequency energy concentration
ratio LECRγ(Sˆ), where γ ∈ [ 1N , 1], is defined as:
LECRγ(Sˆ) =
∑dγNe−1
i=0 |Sˆ(λi)|
Eng(Sˆ)
. (22)
If there is an epidemic in the network, nodes close to the
source will possess similar signal values. Thus, the constructed
graph signal will have low variations among close nodes,
which corresponds to a low frequency graph signal. In contrast,
when the network is affected by random failures, the snapshot
contains randomly positioned failed nodes and the nodes with
similar signal values would tend to be spread throughout
the whole network randomly. This is congruous with a high
frequency graph signal. Therefore, the energy of the spectrum
is focused more on the higher/lower components in the case of
random failures/an epidemic, which is captured using the energy
concentration metrics. For the macro analysis of infections, the
smoothness metric, presented in [17], is also considered.
Definition 8. Smoothness of a graph signal S with respect to
the underlying graph G = (V, E , w, β) is defined as:
SM(S) =
∑
vi∈V
[ ∑
vj∈Nvi
ai,j [S(j)− S(i)]2
] 1
2
. (23)
In the case of an epidemic, as compared to random failures,
this metric receives a smaller value.
B. Algorithm
We present the following two-phase algorithm to carry out
infection detection using the defined metrics:
Offline Phase (Training):
Step 1: Given a training dataset consisting of snapshots
of random failures, for each snapshot, build the graph signal
according to Eq. (2) with a unified signal amplitude A.
Step 2: For each metric, derive the %-prediction interval
capturing the metric value in % of the testing scenarios.
Online Phase (Prediction):
Step 1: Given a snapshot of the network, build the graph
signal according to Eq. (2) using the signal amplitude A.
Step 2: For a given metric, calculate the metric value of the
constructed graph signal.
Step 3: If the calculated value is outside the determined
interval, report an epidemic; otherwise report random failures.
In the Appendix A, we conduct robustness analysis to reveal
the performance of this algorithm upon having a noisy snapshot.
VI. MACHINE LEARNING-BASED MACRO ANALYSIS OF
INFECTIONS
A. Methodology
In this case, we apply machine learning techniques with
two well-known classifiers: naive Bayes (NB) [24] and random
forest (RF) [25]. The following three vectors may be considered
as the primary features for the learning/prediction:
Sˆ = [Sˆ(λ0), Sˆ(λ2), · · · , Sˆ(λN−1)],
ΛDBGWS,s = [W
DBGW
S (v1, s), · · · ,WDBGWS (vN , s)],
ΛSGWS,s = [W
SGW
S (v1, s), · · · ,WSGWS (vN , s)],
(24)
(25)
(26)
where Sˆ is the GFT spectrum, while ΛDBGWS,s and Λ
SGW
S,s
correspond to the collection of the nodes’ wavelet coefficients of
the DBGW and the SGW, respectively, discussed in Section IV.
With one approach of feature extraction (GFT, DBGW, or
SGW), the RF and the NB classifiers are utilized along with two
methods of feature feeding: direct manner and fast approach.
In the direct manner, the classifier is fed with the primary
features given above. In the fast approach, for each primary
feature vector, we obtain three secondary features: the variance,
the average, and the interquartile range, i.e., the difference
between the 75-th and 25-th percentiles of the data (which
can be calculated in O(N) complexity using efficient selection
algorithms), and feed the classifier with them.
B. Algorithm
The following machine learning-based algorithm is proposed
to conduct the macro analysis of infection:
Offline Phase (Training):
Step 1: Given a training dataset of snapshots of both random
failures and epidemics, for each snapshot, build the graph signal
according to Eq. (2) with a unified signal amplitude A.
Step 2: For each scenario, opting one method of feature
extraction, extract the primary features.
Step 3: Selecting one method of feature feeding, train the
NB and RF classifiers.
Online Phase (Prediction):
Step 1: Given a snapshot of the network, build the graph
signal according to Eq. (2) using the signal amplitude A.
Step 2: Based on the derived graph signal, obtain the
prediction features via the same approach used in the training
phase, and feed them to the trained classifiers to obtain the
prediction result.
C. Time Complexity Analysis of the Algorithms
For a prior unknown network structure, to utilize GFT and
SGW, one needs to derive the complete set of eigenvectors of
the Laplacian matrix using the distributed algorithm in [26], or
singular value decomposition methods in the worst complexity
of O(N3). Also, for DBGWs, each node requires to perform
(in the worst case) O(N) computations (for a linear function
H) to derive the DBGW wavelet function centered at itself.
7This can be done in parallel for all nodes when they have the
required information described in IV-B. Nevertheless, for a
fixed and known network structure, the derivation of wavelet
functions and the eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix can be
done offline, which is neglected in the following analysis.
Given a signal S ∈ RN and a scale s, the worst complexity of
deriving Sˆ, ΛDBGWS,s and Λ
SGW
S,s is O(N
2) for each. Note that
using parallelization, ΛDBGWS,s can be derived in O(N) worst
complexity at each node. Hence, the complexity of the learning-
based algorithm is mostly determined by the machine learning
part. For a dataset of k experiments, each with f features, the
learning complexity of the NB and the RF classifiers are O(kf)
and O
(
ntreek
2f ′ log(k)
)
, respectively, where ntree is the
number of trees, and f ′ indicates the number of samples at each
node for the RF model, usually chosen as: f ′ = O(
√
f) [27].
The direct method of feature feeding requires no computation
on the entire vector of features; however, it results in a large
number of features f upon handling large-scale networks. The
fast method needs the calculation of three simple statistics
of the data, all of which can be done efficiently in O(N),
and it leads to three features for training/prediction. Given
the complexity of the machine learning methods mentioned
above, the fast method leads to a faster training/prediction.
For instance, for a network of size 5000, the fast method
leads to 99.94% reduction in the number of features. Also,
the proposed fast method is simpler/faster to implement as
compared to the classic dimensionality reduction methods,
such as principle component analysis, which require eigen-
space decomposition of the collected instances of the training
features. The complexity of deriving the energy concentration-
based metrics and smoothness is O(N2). Also, the detection
based on these metrics is straightforward to implement.
The required basis functions of the GFT, i.e., Laplacian
eigenvectors, can be obtained in a distributed fashion using the
iterative algorithm in [26]. At each iteration of this algorithm,
to obtain k principal eigenvectors, passing the messages of
size O(k3) between the neighbor nodes along with performing
O(k3) computations at each node is required. In this regard,
the proposed machine learning-based algorithm is capable of
using a portion of the GFT spectrum for conducting the macro
analysis. This aspect is further illustrated in Section VIII.
VII. MICRO ANALYSIS OF INFECTIONS
For the micro analysis of infections, we consider two epidemic
countermeasures: vaccination and quarantine. Vaccination refers
to the process in which a portion of non-infected nodes
become immune to the infection, e.g., by installing an anti-
virus software capable of detecting and eliminating the ongoing
virus. On the other hand, quarantine refers to the process in
which a portion of infected nodes lose their spreading potential,
e.g., as some infected computers are identified and restrained
from information exchange. The goal of the micro analysis is
to find the most impactful infected nodes to quarantine, while
determining the most susceptible healthy nodes to vaccinate.
There are many ways to define the impact and susceptibility of
nodes in a network. In this study, the most impactful/susceptible
nodes refer to the infected/healthy nodes completely surrounded
by the nodes in the opposite state, which can be identified
using the DBGWs wavelet coefficients. The following theorem
and corollary provide the foundation for this application of
DBGWs.
Theorem 3. Given a snapshot of a network, assume the
binary graph signal assignment. For an arbitrary scale s, if∑s
r′=1 |msr′ | ≤ |ms0|, the DBGW wavelet coefficients of all the
nodes with the same state have the same sign.
Proof. Let I denote the set of infected nodes. Since ms0 =−∑sr′=1msr′ , WDBGWS (a, s) for any infected node a ∈ V is
given by:
WDBGWS (a, s) =< ψ
DBGW
a,s ,S >= Am
s
0+
Ams1∑
a′∈C1∆0a H (WDP (a, a
′))
[ ∑
b∈C1∆0a ,b∈I
H (WDP (a, b))
−
∑
b∈C1∆0a ,b/∈I
H (WDP (a, b))
]
+
...
+
Amss∑
a′∈Cs∆(s−1)a
H (WDP (a, a′))
[ ∑
b∈Cs∆(s−1)a ,b∈I
H (WDP (a, b))
−
∑
b∈Cs∆(s−1)a ,b/∈I
H (WDP (a, b))
]
.
Since
∑s
r′=1 |msr′ | ≤ |ms0|, we can get:
0 ≤WDBGWS (a, s) ≤ 2Ams0 if ms0 > 0,
2Ams0 ≤WDBGWS (a, s) ≤ 0 if ms0 < 0.
(27)
The same result can be proven for healthy nodes.
Remark 5. Note that the condition
∑s
r′=1 |msr′ | ≤ |ms0| can
be satisfied by a proper choice for this sequence during the
design phase (also see Remark 4).
Corollary 1. (Countermeasure design methodology) Given the
declared condition in Theorem 3, when s = 1 and m10 > 0,
the most impactful/susceptible nodes are the infected/healthy
nodes with the largest/smallest DBGW coefficients.
Proof. This can be validated by deriving the conditions which
lead to the extreme bounds given in Eq. (27). In this case, m01 =
−m11; hence for any infected node a ∈ V , WDBGWS (a, 1) =
Am10 +
Am11∑
a′∈C1∆0a
H (WDP (a, a′))
[ ∑
b∈C1∆0a ,b∈I
H (WDP (a, b))
−
∑
b∈C1∆0a ,b/∈I
H (WDP (a, b))
]
reaches its maximum (2Am10)
when b /∈ I ∀b ∈ C1∆0a . The proof for the healthy nodes
is similar.
Remark 6. Note that with the given conditions in Corollary 1,
as the portion of healthy/infected nodes with close proximity
to an infected/healthy node increases, the value of the wavelet
function increases/decreases. In this regard, we can generalize
the concept to define highly impactful/susceptible nodes, which
correspond to large/small DBGW wavelet coefficients. In the
8case of m10 < 0, the signs of the wavelet coefficients for infected
nodes and healthy nodes will be reversed. More discussions
concerning micro analysis of infections are given in VIII-B.
In addition to the countermeasure design, Theorem 3
provides insights for another potential application of DBGWs,
which is determining the origin of an epidemic. This is mainly
related to finding the source of a rumor in OSNs, which is out
of the scope of this work and presented here as a conjecture.
Conjecture: In a large-scale, (semi-)homogeneous network
structure, the initial source of an epidemic is always among
the nodes with the lowest (in the absolute value sense) DBGW
coefficients at any given scale. Hence, the source can be
identified by gathering the DBGWs coefficients at multiple
scales.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Macro Analysis of Infections
In the simulation, two of the most popular random graph
structures, Erdo¨s–Re´nyi (ER) [28], and Scale-free (SF) graphs
[16], [29], along with a real-world email network (email-Eu-
core) [30], [31], are considered, all of which are described
in Table I. ER graphs are associated with a parameter ρ,
which represents the probability of an edge existing between
any two nodes of the graph. The SF graph is constructed
based on the so-called preferential attachment mechanism,
where the construction process of the graph starts with a small
connected component and at each step one node is added to the
network and connected to Γ existing nodes (with probability
proportionally to node degrees). For the email-Eu-core network,
we use the undirected version of the network presented in [30]
while eliminating the island components. For each graph, the
distances of edges are chosen independently from a uniform
distribution in the interval [1, 100], and the value of A in Eq. (2)
is set to +1000. The AIDP (defined in Section II) results are
presented with respect to the number of infected nodes in the
network, denoted by φ in the following figures.
For performance evaluation, a dataset consisting of 4000
simulations, half for epidemics and half for random failures,
is constructed. The basic infection rate β is set to 0.5, and
10% of false positives and 10% of false negatives are added to
the snapshot. For metric-based detection, an external dataset
consisting of 2000 random failures is used to derive the %-
prediction interval, where  = 95. In simulations, the results
of the LECR and HECR are combined and presented as
one metric called energy concentration, where the algorithm
reports an epidemic if both the LECR and the HECR detect
an epidemic, and random failures otherwise. For the learning-
based algorithms, 10-fold cross-validation is used, in which
the dataset of 2000 epidemics and 2000 random failures is
evenly divided into 10 sub-datasets, each with 200 epidemics
and 200 random failures. In this manner, 10 experiments are
done, where at each experiment 9 sub-datasets are used for the
purpose of training and one is used for prediction. The reported
AIDP is the average accuracy of prediction of 10 experiments.
For DBGWs, s = 1, H(x) = x2, and the sequence {m1r′}1r′=0
is derived based on a zero mean one-sided function supported
at the interval [0, 1] described as: −4
pi1/4
√
3σ
(
16t2
σ2 − 1
)
exp
(
− 8t2σ2
)
with σ = 0.9 (m10 = 0.155, m
1
1 = −0.155). For SGW, to have
a proper band-pass filter focusing on the lower part of the
spectrum, we choose s = 10, and the kernel function is chosen
as a skewed bell-shape function obtained from the toolbox
available at [32]. For the RF classifier ntree = 100, and the
number of samples per node is set as: f ′ = b√fc, where f
denotes the number of features.
The results are compared to the RBD algorithm [14]. In the
simulation, the radius of the ball and the threshold parameters
of this algorithm are both obtained empirically so that the
RBD algorithm exhibits the best performance for the given
dataset. We present four different scenarios below, followed
by a detailed discussion.
Scenario 1: We start with a scenario where the epidemic
starts from one infected node, and the underlying graph
structure is an ER graph with size 1000 and ρ = 0.01.
Simulation results for all the proposed methods are presented in
Figure 3, divided into three sub-figures for ease for illustration.
In the first sub-figure, the metric-based infection analysis
algorithms (c.f. Section V) are presented, and compared to
the RBD algorithm. The other two sub-figures are concerned
with the machine-learning based algorithms with features from
graph Fourier spectrum and graph wavelets (c.f. Section VI),
considering the direct and fast approach, respectively.
Scenario 2: In this scenario, the network structure is the
same as the first scenario. In contrast, the epidemic stems from
4 initial nodes chosen to be far away from each other to avoid
merging of the epidemic in the initial stages of spreading; this
is assumed for the next scenario as well. Simulation results
for all the proposed methods are presented in Figure 4.
Scenario 3: In this scenario, the underlying graph struc-
ture is an SF graph with size 1000 and Γ = 3. Simulation
results for all the proposed methods are presented in Figure 5.
Scenario 4: In this scenario, the underlying graph struc-
ture is the email-Eu-core network. The epidemic stems from 4
randomly chosen nodes. Simulation results for all the proposed
methods are presented in Figure 6.
Discussion of the results: As can be observed in Sub-
fig 1 of Figure 3-6, in most of the cases, our metric based
algorithms have a significantly better performance as compared
to the RBD algorithm; in the cases that the RBD algorithm is
marginally better (see Figure 6), our metric-based algorithms
exhibit excellent detection performance nonetheless (above 93%
for 100 ≤ φ ≤ 800). The machine learning based algorithms
with features from graph Fourier spectrum and graph wavelets
generally exhibit even better performance, as shown in Sub-fig
2 of Figures 3-6. As we discussed earlier, the metric-based
algorithms are generally simpler to implement, so there is
certain tradeoff in selecting these two types of algorithms for
infection analysis considering detection accuracy and simplicity
of implementation. The unsatisfactory performance of the RBD
algorithms is attributed to the irregular and dense structure
of the underlying graphs considered here: according to their
design mechanism, each ball would contain a large portion of
nodes, and the density of infected nodes inside and outside
of the ball would often be similar in such settings. Having
multiple initial seeds of virus further deteriorates the RBD
performance as expected.
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Figure 3: Performance comparison between all the proposed methods and the RBD algorithm for ER graph with size 1000 and parameter
ρ = 0.01, where the epidemic stems from 1 initial seed.
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and the RBD algorithm.
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Figure 4: Performance comparison between all the proposed methods and the RBD algorithm for ER graph with size 1000 and parameter
ρ = 0.01, where the epidemic stems from 4 initial seeds.
In all these figures, the machine learning-based algorithm
using DBGW exhibits the best performance across the board.
For the fast method of feature feeding (Sub-fig 3 of the
figures), this algorithm retains its excellent performance;
however, the performance of the other two machine learning
based algorithms (using GFT and SGW) decreases, sometimes
significantly, when switching from full feature feeding to fast
feature feeding. This indicates that statistical information of
the coefficients of the DBGW (using only three features) is
sufficient for infection detection, which is particularly appealing
for infection analysis in large-scale networks.
One unique characteristic of the machine learning-based
algorithm using GFT is that the learning can be conducted
using a few GFT components directly. This is because each
element of the GFT spectrum captures the signal variation
across the whole network, which is, in general, not the
case in graph wavelets since graph wavelet coefficients are
centered at different nodes by definition. Figure 7 examines the
performance of the machine-learning based algorithms with
GFT and DBGWs for the epidemic processes described in
Scenario 2 upon using a few number of features f for the NB
classifier. In particular, we consider the following choices of the
features for machine learning: (1) the first three GFT spectrum
components
[
Sˆ(λ1), Sˆ(λ2), Sˆ(λ3)
]
(denoted by (L, f = 3)), (2)
the middle three
[
Sˆ(λ499), Sˆ(λ500), Sˆ(λ501)
]
(denoted by (MID,
f = 3)), (3) the last three
[
Sˆ(λ997), Sˆ(λ998), Sˆ(λ999)
]
(denoted by
(H, f = 3)), (4) a combination of the first and the last two[
Sˆ(λ1), Sˆ(λ998), Sˆ(λ999)
]
(denoted by (COMB1, f = 3)), and (5)
another sampling approach using
[
Sˆ(λ1), Sˆ(λ2), Sˆ(λ15), Sˆ(λ999)
]
(denoted by (COMB2, f = 4)). Note that the last three
components are the fastest to obtain in a large-scale network
using the algorithm in [26]. As can be expected, the middle
part of the spectrum does not lead to a good performance.
This implies that analyzing the low and the high frequency
parts of the GFT spectrum is essential to conduct infection
detection. Furthermore, the combined method leads to more
robust performance. Also, by using one more sample (Comb2),
one can get almost the same average performance as compared
to the fast method (2% worse on average). This figure also
confirms the superiority of using DBGWs as features for
machine learning. In particular, for 100 ≤ φ ≤ 800, using
fast DBGW has a performance gain between 7% and 20% as
compared to the fast GFT.
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Figure 5: Performance comparison between all the proposed methods and the RBD algorithm for SF graph with size 1000 and parameter
Γ = 3, where the epidemic stems from 4 initial seeds.
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Figure 6: Performance comparison between all the proposed methods and the RBD algorithm for the email-Eu-core network [30], where the
epidemic stems from 4 initial seeds.
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Figure 7: Comparison between the machine learning-based algorithms
with different number of GFT components and DBGWs with fast
feature feeding using the NB classifier.
B. Micro Analysis of Infections
We conduct micro infection analysis on the Random
Geometric Graph (RGG) [33], dataset107 and dataset698
networks described in Table I. The RGGs are widely used
to model ad-hoc wireless networks [34]. An RGG is formed by
placing N nodes uniformly at random in the unit square and
connecting adjacent nodes by an edge if the Euclidean distance
between them is at most Ξ, where N = 1000,Ξ = 0.08 in
our construction. These networks possess large diameters as
compared to the SF and ER graphs with the same size and
number of edges. The two latter networks are both sampled
instances of the Facebook network [35]. Dataset698 with
fewer nodes is used for the illustration purpose, while the
experimental results are obtained on dataset107 and the RGG.
For all networks, we process their graphs to eliminate island
components prior to simulations. The network and DBGW
settings are the same as VIII-A except that β = 0.25 to account
for a slower spreading of the virus.
1) Interpretation of Coefficients of DBGWs: For an epidemic
stemming form a single source node on the dataset698 network,
Figure 8 depicts the network snapshot (left plot) and the
corresponding nodes’ DBGW coefficients (right plot), where
40% of the nodes are infected. The result of Theorem 3
can be verified since nodes with the same state (in the left
plot) possess wavelet coefficients of the same sign (in the
right plot); in particular, the infected nodes exhibit positive
wavelet coefficients and the healthy nodes exhibit negative
ones. To verify the results of Corollary 1 and Remark 6,
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Figure 8: The snapshot of an epidemic (left) and the corresponding nodes’ DBGW coefficients (right). In the left plot, gray nodes are infected
while the magenta nodes are healthy.
Statistics ER SF email-Eu-core dataset107 dataset698 RGG
Order 1000 1000 986 1033 40 1000
Size 4995 2987 16064 26747 220 9218
AD 9.99 5.97 32.6 51.78 11 18.43
Diameter 5 6 7 9 4 21
ASDL 3.26 3.5 2.59 2.95 1.94 8.18
Table I: Statistics of the networks. (Order: number of nodes, Size:
number of edges, AD: average degree, ASDL: average shortest
distance length)
consider nodes 17, 33, 40 in Figure 8. Node 17 is infected
and has multiple neighbors in the opposite state; hence it
has a large positive DBGW coefficient. Node 33 is healthy
and located in a neighborhood with only one node in the
opposite state; hence it has a coefficient of small magnitude.
Finally, node 40 is surrounded by the nodes in same state;
hence the DBGW coefficient is zero.6 The set of candidates
for the purpose of quarantine/vaccination comprises the nodes
with the largest/smallest DBGW’s wavelet coefficients. In this
case, a good set of candidates for quarantine comprises nodes
17, 5, 25, 27, which are surrounded with mostly healthy nodes.
Similarly, nodes 11, 35, 37, 29 are good suggestions for the
purpose of vaccination.
2) Experimental Results: Figure 9 depicts the effectiveness
of quarantine using the nodes’ DBGW coefficients as a
countermeasure to an epidemic simulated on the RGG (left
sub-figure) and the dataset107 (right sub-figure). The height of
each bar indicates the average time for the epidemic to reach a
certain number of infected nodes (φ), after quarantining 20%
of the 200 infected nodes at the beginning of the observation
(t = 1) and quarantining 20% of infected nodes each time the
epidemic infects 100 more healthy nodes. Therefore, a taller
bar implies a more effective countermeasure. As a baseline,
the epidemic evolution without deploying any countermeasure
is depicted along with quarantining via random, and degree-
based, (i.e., quarantining those infected nodes with the highest
degrees). For each case, 100 Monte Carlo simulations are
conducted, and the error bars indicate the standard deviation
of the results. As can be seen, DBGW-based selection proves
to be the most effective quarantining method. This effect is
especially preeminent in the RGG (on average 50% longer time
as compared to the degree-based) due to its large diameter. For
the dataset107 network, due to its dense structure and relatively
6Due to the consideration of proximity of the neighbors reflected by edge
weights in DBGWs, nodes with the same degree and the same number of
neighbor nodes with an opposite state may have different coefficients.
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Figure 9: Comparison between different methods of quarantine on
the RGG (left) and the dataset107 (right) described in Table I.
short diameter, at φ = 300 there are still plenty of healthy
nodes in the “core”, so the non-quarantined infected nodes
can still infect many victims, which makes the quarantine
ineffective. Nonetheless, the performance gap between the
DBGW-based method and others increases with φ, and reaches
50% compared to the degree-based method at φ = 500.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we conducted both the macro and the micro
infection analysis for irregular and heterogeneous networks,
through graph signal processing techniques. For the macro
analysis: 1) effective metrics based on the GFT spectrum are
proposed; 2) a new class of graph wavelets, DBGWs, are
introduced; and 3) both metric-based and machine learning-
based infection analysis algorithms are developed. For the micro
analysis, new vaccination and quarantine countermeasures using
DBGWs are proposed. Through extensive simulations, the
superiority of all the proposed algorithms are revealed as
compared to the state-of-the-art. Given the simplicity and
effectiveness of the proposed approaches in this paper, we
expect that this work can shed light on further applications
of graph signal processing on networking problems. One
interesting future direction is to extend the study to time varying
and multilayer networks.
APPENDIX A
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS OF THE METRICS
Upon having a large number of faulty observations, dis-
tinguishing an epidemic from random failures can become
impossible. In the following, for each metric, upper-bounds
on the number of faulty observations are derived to ensure the
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correct detection. Also, the results are derived based on a given
number of false positives nfp and false negatives nfn, where
nf = nfp + nfn. In this case, the noise vector (described
in II-E, n, takes the value of 2A in nfp indices, the value of
−2A in nfn indices, and the value of zero elsewhere.
Theorem 4. For the energy concentration high metric, given
an %-prediction interval for random failures [Cs, Ce], if
HECRα(Sˆ
(i)) = Ci, the following bounds guarantee the
correct detection upon existence of an epidemic:
Case 1: If Ci < Cs:
nf <
[
CsE˜ng(Sˆ
(n))−∑N−1j=bN(1−α)c ∣∣ ˆ˜S(i)(λj)∣∣
2(1 + bNαc) max
j∈
[
bN(1−α)c,N−1
] ‖uj‖∞
]+
. (28)
Case 2: If Ci > Ce:
nf <
[ −∑N−1j=bN(1−α)c ˜Sˆ(i)(λj)− CeE˜ng(Sˆ(n))
2(1 + bNαc) max
j∈
[
bN(1−α)c,N−1
] ‖uj‖∞
]+
,
if 0 >
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(n),uj >
nf <
[ ∑N−1
j=bN(1−α)c
˜Sˆ(i)(λj)− CeE˜ng(Sˆ(n))
2(1 + bNαc) max
j∈
[
bN(1−α)c,N−1
] ‖uj‖∞
]+
,
if 0 ≤
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(n),uj >,
(29)
where [a]+ = max(a, 0) for a ∈ R.
Proof. For Case 1, HECRα(Sˆ(n)) < Cs ensures the correct
detection. This implies:
HECRα(Sˆ
(n)) =
∑N−1
j=bN(1−α)c |Sˆ(n)(λj)|
Eng(Sˆ(n))
=
∑N−1
j=bN(1−α)c
∣∣∣< S(i),uj > + < n,uj >∣∣∣
Eng(Sˆ(n))
< Cs. (30)
In a Hilbert space, any two vectors a, b satisfy the triangle
inequality, ||a| − |b|| ≤ |a + b| ≤ |a| + |b|. Hence, using the
maximum of the numerator, we get:∑N−1
j=bN(1−α)c
∣∣∣< S(i),uj > + < n,uj >∣∣∣
Eng(Sˆ(n))
<∑N−1
j=bN(1−α)c | < S(i),uj > |+
∣∣∑N
k=1 n(k)uj(k)
∣∣
Eng(Sˆ(n))
.
(31)
Using the triangle inequality, we get:∣∣∣ N∑
k=1
n(k)uj(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ 2Anfp ‖uj‖∞ + 2Anfn ‖uj‖∞
= 2Anf ‖uj‖∞ . (32)
Using the above inequality in Eq. (31) and the condition for
correct detection in Eq. (30) yields:
nf <
CsEng(Sˆ
(n))−∑N−1j=bN(1−α)c | < S(i),uj > |
2A(1 + bNαc) max
j∈
[
bN(1−α)c,N−1
] ‖uj‖∞ , (33)
which leads to the theorem result. For Case 2, we need to
have HECRα(Sˆ(n)) > Ce. For a sequence of real numbers
{ai}pi=1, we can get:
∑p
i=1 |ai| ≥
∣∣∑p
i=1 ai
∣∣; hence:
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
∣∣∣< S(i),uj > + N∑
k=1
n(k)uj(k)
∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣∣
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(i),uj > +
N∑
k=1
n(k)uj(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
> Eng(Sˆ(n))Ce, (34)
which leads to the two following conditions:
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(i),uj > +
N∑
k=1
n(k)uj(k)
> Eng(Sˆ(n))Ce, if 0 ≤
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(n),uj >,
(35)
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(i),uj > +
N∑
k=1
n(k)uj(k)
< −Eng(Sˆ(n))Ce, if 0 >
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(n),uj > .
(36)
Similar to Eq. (32), it can be derived that:
N∑
k=1
n(k)uj(k) ≥ −2Anf ‖uj‖∞ . (37)
Using this fact and the condition in Eq. (35), we get:
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
Sˆ(i)(λj)− 2Anf ‖uj‖∞ > Eng(Sˆ(n))Ce. (38)
Therefore,
nf <
∑N
j=bN(1−α)c Sˆ
(i)(λj)− Eng(Sˆ(n))Ce
2A(1 + bNαc) max
j∈
[
bN(1−α)c,N−1
] ‖uj‖∞ . (39)
Following the condition in Eq. (36), we get:
N−1∑
j=bN(1−α)c
< S(i),uj > +
N∑
k=1
n(k)uj(k)
< −Eng(Sˆ(n))Ce.
(40)
Therefore,
nf <
∑N−1
j=bN(1−α)c < S
(i),uj > +CeEng(Sˆ
(n))
−2A(1 + bNαc) max
j∈
[
bN(1−α)c,N−1
] ‖uj‖∞ . (41)
A similar bound can be derived for the LECR metric.
13
Theorem 5. For the smoothness metric, given an %-prediction
interval for random failures [Cs, Ce], if SM(S(i)) = Ci, then
the following bounds guarantee the correct detection upon
existence of an epidemic:
nf <
[
Ci − Ce
2AD
3
2
√
∆ + 2A
√
∆D
]+
if Ci > Ce,
nf <
[
Cs − Ci
2AD
3
2
√
∆ + 2A
√
∆D
]+
if Ci < Cs.
(42)
(43)
where D is the maximum degree of the nodes and ∆ is the
maximum distance of the edges of the graph.
Proof. Considering Eq. (23), the effect of adding nf faulty
observations can be bounded as follows:
SM(S(n)) ≤ SM(S(i)) + 2nfAD 32
√
∆ + 2nfA
√
∆D, (44)
where the second term is associated with the neighbors of the
faulty observations and the last term is associated with the
faulty observations. Similarly, we can get:
SM(S(n)) ≥ SM(S(i))− 2nfAD 32
√
∆− 2nfA
√
∆D. (45)
If Ci > Ce, the correct detection is ensured upon having:
2nfAD
3
2
√
∆ + 2nfA
√
∆D < Ci − Ce. (46)
If Ci < CS , the correct detection is ensured upon having:
2nfAD
3
2
√
∆ + 2nfA
√
∆D < Cs − Ci. (47)
The theorem result can be obtained from Eq. (46), (47).
Note that HECR and LECR metrics are not sensitive to
the value of A, which is not the case in the smoothness metric.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Hosseinalipour, J. Wang, H. Dai, and W. Wang, “Detection of infections
using graph signal processing in heterogeneous networks,” in Proc. IEEE
Global Commun. Conf. (GLOBECOM), 2017, pp. 1–6.
[2] P. Knight, “Iloveyou: Viruses, paranoia, and the environment of risk,”
The Sociological Rev., vol. 48, no. S2, pp. 17–30, 2000.
[3] C. Wong, S. Bielski, J. M. McCune, and C. Wang, “A study of mass-
mailing worms,” in Proc. ACM workshop Rapid Malcode, 2004, pp.
1–10.
[4] B. Ayhan, M. Y. Chow, and M. H. Song, “Multiple discriminant analysis
and neural-network-based monolith and partition fault-detection schemes
for broken rotor bar in induction motors,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron.,
vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 1298–1308, June 2006.
[5] J. Yin, Q. Yang, and J. J. Pan, “Sensor-based abnormal human-activity
detection,” IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 1082–1090,
Aug 2008.
[6] H. Li and Z. Han, “Catch me if you can: An abnormality detection
approach for collaborative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 3554–3565, November
2010.
[7] D. Centola, “The spread of behavior in an online social network
experiment,” Science, vol. 329, no. 5996, pp. 1194–1197, 2010.
[8] Z. Wang, W. Dong, W. Zhang, and C. W. Tan, “Rooting our rumor
sources in online social networks: The value of diversity from multiple
observations,” IEEE J. Sel. Topics Signal Process., vol. 9, no. 4, pp.
663–677, June 2015.
[9] D. Shah and T. Zaman, “Rumors in a network: Who’s the culprit?” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 5163–5181, Aug 2011.
[10] A. L. Lloyd and R. M. May, “How viruses spread among computers and
people,” Science, vol. 292, no. 5520, pp. 1316–1317, 2001.
[11] Z. He, Z. Cai, J. Yu, X. Wang, Y. Sun, and Y. Li, “Cost-efficient strategies
for restraining rumor spreading in mobile social networks,” IEEE Trans.
Veh. Technol., vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 2789–2800, March 2017.
[12] S. Wen, J. Jiang, Y. Xiang, S. Yu, W. Zhou, and W. Jia, “To shut them up
or to clarify: Restraining the spread of rumors in online social networks,”
IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 25, no. 12, pp. 3306–3316, Dec
2014.
[13] C. Milling, C. Caramanis, S. Mannor, and S. Shakkottai, “Detecting
epidemics using highly noisy data,” in Proc. 14th ACM Int. Symp. Mobile
Ad Hoc Netw. and Comput. (MobiHoc), 2013, pp. 177–186.
[14] ——, “Local detection of infections in heterogeneous networks,” in IEEE
Conf. Comput. Commun. (INFOCOM), April 2015, pp. 1517–1525.
[15] A.-L. Baraba´si, R. Albert, and H. Jeong, “Scale-free characteristics of
random networks: the topology of the world-wide web,” Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics Appl., vol. 281, no. 1, pp. 69 – 77, 2000.
[16] R. Albert and A.-L. Baraba´si, “Statistical mechanics of complex networks,”
Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 74, pp. 47–97, Jan 2002.
[17] D. I. Shuman, S. K. Narang, P. Frossard, A. Ortega, and P. Vandergheynst,
“The emerging field of signal processing on graphs: Extending high-
dimensional data analysis to networks and other irregular domains,”
IEEE Signal Process. Mag., vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 83–98, May 2013.
[18] A. Sandryhaila and J. M. F. Moura, “Discrete signal processing on graphs:
Frequency analysis,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 62, no. 12, pp.
3042–3054, June 2014.
[19] ——, “Discrete signal processing on graphs,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 61, no. 7, pp. 1644–1656, April 2013.
[20] M. Crovella and E. Kolaczyk, “Graph wavelets for spatial traffic analysis,”
in Proc. 22nd IEEE Comput. Commun. Soc. (INFOCOM), vol. 3, March
2003, pp. 1848–1857.
[21] D. K. Hammond, P. Vandergheynst, and R. Gribonval, “Wavelets on
graphs via spectral graph theory,” Appl. and Computational Harmonic
Anal., vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 129–150, 2011.
[22] M. K. Mihcak, I. Kozintsev, K. Ramchandran, and P. Moulin, “Low-
complexity image denoising based on statistical modeling of wavelet
coefficients,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 6, no. 12, pp. 300–303,
Dec 1999.
[23] T. F. Chan and J. Shen, Image processing and analysis: variational, PDE,
wavelet, and stochastic methods. SIAM, 2005.
[24] I. Rish, “An empirical study of the naive bayes classifier,” in Proc. IJCAI
workshop Empirical Methods Artificial Intell., vol. 3, no. 22. IBM,
2001, pp. 41–46.
[25] L. Breiman, “Random forests,” Mach. learning, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 5–32,
2001.
[26] D. Kempe and F. McSherry, “A decentralized algorithm for spectral
analysis,” J. Comput. and Syst. Sci., vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 70–83, 2008.
[27] G. Louppe, “Understanding random forests: From theory to practice,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.7502, 2014.
[28] P. Ero¨ds and A. Re´nyi, “On random graphs i,” Publ. Math. Debrecen,
vol. 6, pp. 290–297, 1959.
[29] A.-L. Baraba´si and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random networks,”
science, vol. 286, no. 5439, pp. 509–512, 1999.
[30] J. Leskovec and A. Krevl, “SNAP Datasets: Stanford large network
dataset collection,” http://snap.stanford.edu/data, Jun. 2014.
[31] H. Yin, A. R. Benson, J. Leskovec, and D. F. Gleich, “Local higher-order
graph clustering,” in Proc. 23rd ACM SIGKDD Int. Conf. Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining. ACM, 2017, pp. 555–564.
[32] “The spectral graph wavelets toolbox,” https://wiki.epfl.ch/sgwt, accessed:
2018-05-05.
[33] J. Dall and M. Christensen, “Random geometric graphs,” Phys. Rev. E,
vol. 66, p. 016121, Jul 2002.
[34] M. Haenggi, J. G. Andrews, F. Baccelli, O. Dousse, and M. Franceschetti,
“Stochastic geometry and random graphs for the analysis and design of
wireless networks,” EEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 27, no. 7, 2009.
[35] J. McAuley and J. Leskovec, “Learning to discover social circles in ego
networks,” in Proc. 25th Int. Conf. Neural Inform. Process. Syst. (NIPS),
USA, 2012, pp. 539–547.
